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Theorizing and Generalizing about Risk
Assessment and Regulation through
Comparative Nested Analysis of
Representative Cases
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JAMES K. HAMMITT, and JONATHAN B. WIENER

This article provides a framework and offers strategies for theorizing and generalizing about risk assessment and regulation developed in the context of an on-going
comparative study of regulatory behavior. Construction of a universe of nearly
3,000 risks and study of a random sample of 100 of these risks allowed us to
estimate relative U.S. and European regulatory precaution over a thirty-ﬁve-year
period. Comparative nested analysis of cases selected from this universe of
ecological, health, safety, and other risks or its eighteen categories or ninety-two
subcategories of risk sources or causes will allow theory-testing and -building and
many further descriptive and causal comparative generalizations.

I. INTRODUCTION

This article provides a framework and offers strategies for theorizing and
generalizing about risk assessment and regulation developed in the context
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of an ongoing comparative study of regulatory behavior. Construction of a
universe of nearly 3,000 risks and study of a random sample of 100 of these
risks allowed us to estimate relative U.S. and European regulatory precaution
or stringency over a thirty-ﬁve-year period (Hammitt et al. 2005; Swedlow et al.
forthcoming). Comparative nested analysis of cases selected from this universe
of ecological, health, safety, and other risks or its eighteen categories or
ninety-two subcategories of risk sources or causes will allow theory-testing and
-building and many further descriptive and causal comparative generalizations.
With some exceptions, testing and building general theories of risk assessment and regulation ultimately requires broad, representative data of high
quality (see, e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Brady and Collier 2004;
Coppedge 1999, 2005, 2006; Lieberman 2005). The lack of such data also
prevents accurate descriptive generalizations about interesting and important
regulatory behavior. Unfortunately, scholars have not selected cases nor
organized themselves and their research in a way that allows them to test
and build general theories or to generalize about risk assessment and regulation
(see Kagan 1995; Wiener 2003; Levi-Faur 2006 for related points).
In the initial phase of this research project, for example, we found a
signiﬁcant body of literature comparing the relative precaution embodied in
European and U.S. risk regulation (cited in Hammitt et al. 2005 and
Swedlow et al. forthcoming). Some scholars claim that Europe is more
precautionary than the United States, and others claim that the United States
is more precautionary than Europe. A variety of other patterns have also been
suggested. Evidence to support these generalizations consists of comparative
case studies, sometimes of one policy area, such as genetically modiﬁed food,
or sector, such as workplace safety or chemical regulation, other times of
diverse cases within one sector, such as environmental regulation, or various
sectors, such as environmental, health, and safety regulation.
The varied and opposing generalizations are not surprising given the cases
selected for comparison. When different scholars study different sets of
regulatory cases of unknown and unestimable representativeness, they more
likely than not will arrive at nongeneralizeable and frequently contradictory
conclusions. General theories of risk assessment and regulation cannot be
validated on such inadequate empirical foundations. Unfortunately, these
problems are ones that precautionary research shares with comparative
regulatory research of all stripes (as further discussed in Wiener 2003).
While there are no studies of risk assessment and/or regulation that are
based on a large set of representative case studies, nor, consequently, any
studies that seek to test theories of risk assessment and/or regulation on
such a representative population of cases, two studies embody elements of
improved approaches to the study of risk assessment and regulation that we
hope to build on here.
Allan Mazur’s True Warnings and False Alarms: Evaluating Fears about
the Health Risks of Technology, 1948–1971 (2004) is an attempt to study a
fairly large number of cases (thirty-one), systematically selected from a
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larger set of cases (forty-ﬁve), less systematically selected by another scholar
from an even larger number of cases (200+). Mazur’s study suggests how it
might be possible to conduct case studies that allow inferences about a
larger population of cases. Moreover, Mazur’s study demonstrates that a
fairly large number of cases can be studied in sufﬁcient depth to permit
valid quantitative analysis of the results and shows how such analysis can
be used to test four hypotheses about risk assessment and regulation (as
further discussed in Swedlow 2005 and Swedlow et al. forthcoming).
Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin’s The Government
of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes (2001), meanwhile, compares
three theories—regarding market failure, public opinion, and interest
groups—for their ability to explain variation in the assessment and
regulation of nine risks. These scholars do not claim that these nine risks,
or their assessment and regulation, are representative of any larger population of risks. However, their methods of operationalizing rival theories and
scoring the assessment and regulation of the nine risks on various dimensions
of variation could be replicated with a larger set of representative cases and,
as they recognize, the results could be quantiﬁed, allowing statistical analysis,
and an estimate of the actual explanatory power of rival theories.
Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin ﬁnd that some of the variation in risk
assessment and regulation that is not explained by the three theories they
test is explained by the cultural theory developed by Mary Douglas, Aaron
Wildavsky, and others, including Hood, an obvious candidate theory to
test as an explanation for such variation.1 Studying the assessment and
regulation of the 100 representative risks will also help advance longrunning debates in comparative studies of regulation about the relative
inﬂuence of international, national, policy sector, and temporal inﬂuences
on risk assessment and regulation (as discussed in Levi-Faur 2004; see also
Vogel 1996).
As we will discuss, Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin suggest that all
regulatory regimes will have some common elements, implying that any
theory of risk assessment and regulation would have to account for variation
in these. After surveying theories of regulation, other scholars conclude that
there are public, private, and institutionalist theories of regulation, and that
all theories of regulation seek to explain certain aspects of regulation
(Morgan and Yeung 2007).
These observations help support the development here of ﬁve empirical
research questions that should be common to all theories of risk assessment
and regulation. Answers to these ﬁve questions should allow the testing and
building of many such theories. The ﬁve questions and the extent to which
they have been answered by ongoing student research in courses taught by
one of us will be brieﬂy described in this article.
Finally, this article seeks to exploit recent advances in comparative
research methods that combine qualitative, case-study approaches with
quantitative, statistical ones. These methods of “nested analysis” require
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some theory and some quantitative analysis of relationships in a large
population of cases and use that theory and quantitative analysis to
select speciﬁc cases for in-depth study (see Seawright and Gerring 2008;
Lieberman 2005; and Coppedge 2005). This article will explain how
“nested analysis” can be used to select cases for study from among the
100 representative risks.
In what follows, we describe the construction and categorization of our
data-set or “risk matrix,” assess the representativeness of the sample of 100
risks that we randomly selected from it, outline how we characterize relative
U.S. and European regulatory precaution regarding these representative
risks, and summarize the results of our ongoing study thus far. Then, drawing
on theories of risk assessment and regulation, we develop ﬁve empirical
research questions and describe how these questions are being answered by
students in courses taught by one of us. We next describe purposive and
random case selection methods and provide examples of how one might
use these methods to select matrix risks to advance theory development
and descriptive generalizations about regulatory behavior. The purposive
methods are all forms of nested analysis that combine quantitative and
qualitative approaches to research. We close with a brief discussion of three
research tracks along which we believe it will be most fruitful to proceed in
order to theorize and generalize about risk assessment and regulation.

II. THE RISK MATRIX: A UNIVERSE OF HAZARDS THAT MAY BE
ASSESSED AND REGULATED2

Threats to the environment and/or human health and/or safety are consistent
candidates for risk assessment and regulation. Ecological, health, safety,
and other risks thus provide a universe of hazards that may be assessed and
regulated. All regulation may not be risk regulation, but risk regulation is
an identiﬁable, very large subset of regulation. If the contents of this risk
universe can be speciﬁed to a reasonable degree, we will be in a position to
theorize and generalize about risk assessment and regulation.
As we were unable to identify a preexisting, ready-made risk universe
from which to select cases for study, we developed a risk matrix: a nearly
comprehensive list of risks. The matrix was constructed using an iterative
search process. First, we identiﬁed lists of risks and pooled them. The task
of ﬁnding risk lists began with a few well-known sources, such as Renn and
Rohrmann (2000), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA;
1987) Unﬁnished Business, and numerous studies by Paul Slovic and colleagues
(e.g., Axelrod et al. 1999; Englander et al. 1986; Fischhoff et al. 1991;
Goszczynska et al. 1991; Hohenemser et al. 1983; Kraus and Slovic 1988;
Lichtenstein et al. 1978; McDaniels et al. 1995). Next, we attempted to
expand the risk list using a snowball method to pursue sources cited by
these original sources. Third, we pursued other search methods, including
© 2009 The Authors
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searching library databases and the World Wide Web, to ensure a thorough
search for risk lists in the existing literature.
We attempted to ﬁnd and include every study of risk perceptions and
every risk-ranking exercise published in the United States or Europe since
1970. We focused on environmental, health, and safety risks, and ruled out
sources that seemed to be exclusively about other kinds of risks. Although
we did not include sources dealing exclusively with ﬁnancial, business, or
insurance risks, examples of these risks were on some of the lists we
included, and so these types of risks are represented in our matrix (although
not as diversely or frequently as if we had drawn lists from those literatures). The search was also limited to English-language sources and focused
on sources from the United States and Europe. But, again, our search
methods led us to include sources that covered other countries or regions.
Thus, our risk matrix includes risk lists from many areas outside the United
States and Europe.
While we intended to draw on a population of risk lists produced by
scholars, governments, think tanks, and advocacy groups, our search
resulted in a population drawn primarily from academic sources, particularly
the literature on risk perception. We assume (1) that the risks appearing on
scholarly lists reﬂect risks that are of concern to the people and organizations that scholars studied and (2) that the risk concerns of these people
and organizations are representative of U.S. and European populations.
The search produced an original matrix of 11,992 “verbatim risks” (i.e.,
risks described exactly as on the list from which it was taken). These risks
come from 403 risk lists3 from 252 sources.4 In almost all cases, the verbatim
risks were associated with a geographic region. A total of 7,758 risks pertain
to the United States, 1,712 to Europe, and 1,635 to both. The greater
number of risks for the United States than for Europe may reﬂect the
fact that the primary research was conducted in the United States with
easier access to U.S. sources. It may also reﬂect a larger underlying volume
of risk research produced in the United States than in Europe. We are
unsure whether it could reﬂect a larger variety of risks having been of
concern to scholars, policymakers, and the public in the United States than
in Europe.
Since our study focused on the United States and Europe, the 887 risks
(from twenty-nine risk lists and twenty-four sources) pertaining to other
regions were deleted, leaving a total of 11,105 verbatim risks, 374 risk lists,
and 228 sources. The ﬁnal matrix includes only 10,869 risks because 122
unique risks were deleted when we decided they were not really risks or
were too vague to study,5 and nineteen risks were inadvertently overlooked
when transferring risks from one worksheet to another.
The matrix of 10,869 verbatim risks was condensed to 2,878 “unique
risks” by combining essentially identical verbatim risks by reducing plurals
and singulars to a common form, standardizing punctuation, and removing
unique expressions.6
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Although we attempted to develop as unbiased a process as practical
for constructing the risk matrix, the snowball literature-search method
we adopted may favor particular lines of research. We are conﬁdent,
however, that if other researchers followed our procedures and criteria,
they would produce a matrix substantively comparable to ours, albeit
with some differences in distribution. While acknowledging these
limitations of our matrix, we believe that given the time and resources
available to us, it represents a nearly comprehensive list and a substantial
improvement over previous studies.7 We believe our method of comprehensive literature search is superior to other possible methods such as
surveying risks that are currently regulated, compiling lists from
governmental publications, or focusing only on visible, salient risks
(e.g., from news media coverage), because those methods omit risks that
could be of concern but not yet regulated in one legal system or the
other—precisely the kind of emergent risks that might in time be subject to
precautionary regulation or that might illustrate interesting contrasts across
the legal systems.
A. ECOLOGICAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY RISKS

We initially decided to categorize matrix risks to get a sense of the geography
and topography of the risk universe. What kinds of risks were there? And
how many of each kind of risk were there? We also recognized that categorizing risks in this way could be useful in further studies of regulatory
behavior. As we will discuss, our risk types provide a way to assess the
representativeness of random samples drawn from the risk matrix, create a
basis for purposive sampling, and can serve as controls for studying risks
within categories and subcategories. Moreover, the categories and subcategories can be treated as units to be sampled as well as sampling frames,
allowing two-stage sampling of matrix risks.
Recognizing that no method of classifying risks can serve all useful
purposes (Morgan et al. 2000), we nevertheless developed two approaches
to categorizing the universe of 2,878 unique risks: by endpoint (ecological,
health, or safety) and by type of source or cause. The endpoint categories
are not mutually exclusive, as a risk may pose ecological, health, and/or
safety consequences. In contrast, the risk types are exclusive, so that each
risk appears in exactly one risk-type category (although, as we will discuss,
some risks can be assigned to more than one category).
We categorized risks as ecological, health, or safety depending on the
endpoint, not the agent or vector. Although these terms are frequently used
to describe risks, they are rarely deﬁned, and deﬁnitions that do exist are
often imprecise or conﬂicting. By our deﬁnition, health and safety risks
threaten humans directly, while ecological risks threaten nonhuman
endpoints. The U.S. EPA deﬁnes an ecological impact as “the effect that a
man-caused or natural activity has on living organisms and their non-living
© 2009 The Authors
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(abiotic) environment” (EPA 2002).8 We restate this deﬁnition as: ecological
risks are risks that may harm non-human organisms and their supporting
physical conditions. We describe these risks as ecological rather than
environmental to encompass risks to both the abiotic environment and its
organisms. We restrict attention to nonhuman organisms because risks to
humans are classiﬁed under health and safety. Examples of ecological risks
include biodiversity loss, oil spills, acid rain, pesticide and chemical pollution,
and hazardous waste sites.
Distinguishing between health and safety risks is more difﬁcult because
both are risks to humans. Drawing from Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (2003), Koren (1996), and Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1993),9 we deﬁne health as human physical, mental, and social
well-being,10 where well-being is the unimpaired ability to perform vital
functions. Characteristics that differentiate health risks from safety risks
are identiﬁed by Kolluru (1996). Health risks typically derive from
“chronic (long-term) exposure to low-concentrations” (ibid.: 4.6) and have
long-latency, delayed effects. However, diseases can manifest years later
from acute (short-term) exposures as well. Therefore, we deﬁne health risks
as risks that may cause latent illness, disease, or other impairments of health
to humans as a result of acute or chronic exposure. Examples of health risks
include AIDS, pesticides in food, hazardous waste sites affecting humans,
air pollution, cigarette smoking, and alcohol.
Kolluru (ibid.) states that “safety risks stem from acute hazards,” are
usually characterized by a low probability of high exposure, highconsequence accidents, and have acute, immediate effects. “The endpoints
are well deﬁned: fatalities, injuries, and economic losses” (ibid.: 1.13). We
deﬁne safety risks as risks that may cause injury or fatality to humans as an
immediate result of acute (i.e., short-term) exposure. Safety risks include
workplace accidents, automobile crashes, airplane crashes, bridge collapses,
and terrorism. Although these safety risks may impair one’s health, these
are immediate effects instead of long latency, so, for our purposes, we
classify them as safety risks.
Table 1 reports the distribution of the 2,878 unique risks by endpoint
category. Most risks affect more than one endpoint category. More than
one-third of the risks affect all three endpoints, one-quarter affect two
endpoints (usually health and safety), and one-third affect only a single
endpoint. About 2 percent of the risks are classiﬁed as affecting none of
these endpoints.11 About three-quarters of the risks affect health or safety,
and almost half affect ecological endpoints.
B. EIGHTEEN CAUSES OR SOURCES OF RISK IN NINETY-TWO SUBCATEGORIES

To categorize risks by cause or source, we read through the alphabetically
organized list of 2,878 unique risks from top to bottom, assigning number
1 to the ﬁrst risk and every risk that appeared similar to it, number 2 to the
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Table 1. Ecological, Health, and Safety Risks
Percentage in
Endpoint category
0 None
1.1 Ecological
1.2 Health
1.3 Safety
Total—one category
2.1 Ecological and health
2.2 Ecological and safety
2.3 Health and safety
Total—two categories
3 Ecological, health, and safety
Total—All
Total—All Ecological (1.1, 2.1, 2.2, 3)
Total—All Health (1.2, 2.1, 2.3, 3)
Total—All Safety (1.3, 2.2, 2.3, 3)

Matrix

Sample

2.2
2.7
17.7
15.3
35.6
4.2
3.6
17.2
25.0
37.2
100.0
47.7
76.3
73.2

2
3
16
21
42
1
2
16
19
39
100
45
72
78

Table 1 previously appeared in Hammitt et al. (2005).

ﬁrst risk that appeared different from category 1 and every subsequent risk
that appeared similar to it, and so on. This helped us group similar risks
together and allowed us to begin to see what subcategories might exist and
how risks might have to be recategorized to gain the greatest logical coherence. This coding exercise also helped us to see that there was no one right
way to code all risks, that there were tradeoffs in different coding systems,
and that some risks resisted categorization.
The coding effort required many judgment calls. For example, many risks
could fall into more than one category (e.g., environmental tobacco smoke could
be classiﬁed as tobacco or air pollution). As we will see, this coding challenge
creates opportunities to strengthen causal inferences and generalizations.
Many of the challenges involved whether to establish a new category or
subcategory, what to name it, and how broad or speciﬁc to make it.
This process produced eighteen risk-type categories, which were then
given labels that encompassed their contents. The same process was used to
generate subcategories within the categories. We ended up with ninety-two
of these, as can be seen in Table 2.
Table 3 lists our eighteen major risk-type categories together with the distribution of the 2,878 unique risks among them. The frequency distribution
by category in the matrix of 2,878 risks is presented in the third column.
The smallest category (construction risks) includes only 1.4 percent of the
unique risks, while the largest category (occupational risks) includes
ﬁfteen percent of the unique risks.
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Table 2. 100 Risks Randomly Selected from a Universe of 2,878 Risks
(and Their Distribution Across 18 Risk Categories and 92 Risk Subcategories)
Risk Categories (18) and
Subcategories (92)
1.

100 Representative Risks

CRIME AND VIOLENCE RISKS
Burglary*
Sabotage*
Firearms*

2.

ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, AND OTHER DRUG RISKS
Alcohol risks
Sake*
Tobacco risks
Smoking regulations*
Drug abuse (Non-prescription illegal
Pot smoking*
drugs) risks

3.

MEDICATIONS AND MEDICAL TREATMENT RISKS
Adverse drug reaction risks
Shortage of medicines
Caffeine—chronic effects*
Medical procedure risks
Childbearing*
Radiation therapy*
Medical error risks not elsewhere classiﬁed
Vaccination risks
Vaccination—side effects*
X-ray risks
Other medical risks
Health care facilities and services—
exposure to physical agents
Health care facilities and services*
Genetic engineering*

4.

TRANSPORTATION RISKS
Space vehicle risks
Aircraft risks

Automobile risks
Pedestrian risks
Motorcycle risks
Train risks
Ship risks
Other transportation risks

Aerospace manufacture and maintenance—
environmental and public health issues*
Aviation—commercial—noise*
Aviation—commercial—crashes*
Airport and ﬂight control
Bus—transit*
Drinking and driving*

Train accident*
Submarine—accidents
Transportation noise
Highway safety*
Automobile—bicycle accident*
Snowmobiles
Motor vehicle trafﬁc

5.

ACCIDENT RISKS NOT ELSEWHERE CLASSIFIED
Explosive risks
Fire risks
Fire/explosion*
Accident risks not elsewhere classiﬁed
Disaster preparedness*

6.

RECREATION RISKS
Transportation as recreation risks
Mountain recreation risks

Snowboarding
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Table 2. Continued

Risk Categories (18) and
Subcategories (92)
Water recreation risks
Aerial recreation risks
Sport risks not elsewhere classiﬁed

Recreation risks not elsewhere classiﬁed

100 Representative Risks

Hang gliding
Horse riding—falls, including racing
Rodeo performer
Jogging
Rollercoasters*
Amusement park rides
Circuses and amusement and theme parks

7.

WAR, SECURITY, AND TERRORISM RISKS
Anti-ballistic missile*
War and terrorism*
Nuclear weapons—test*

8.

TOXIC SUBSTANCE RISKS
Chemical risks

Asbestos risks
Metal risks
Poison risks not classiﬁed elsewhere
Household chemical risks
Toxic substance risks not elsewhere
classiﬁed
9.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE RISKS
Pesticide and herbicide risks
Diet and nutrition risks
Genetically modiﬁed food risks

Food product risks

Biologically contaminated food risks
Food additives and preservatives risks
Food irradiation risks
Other food and agriculture risks
10.

POLLUTION RISKS
Water pollution risks not elsewhere
classiﬁed
Surface water pollution risks

Nitrocompounds—aromatic*
Hexachlorophene*
Formaldehyde—workers*
Polyvinyl chloride—living nearby*
Timber preservatives*
Ammonia*
Metal manufacturing

Hazardous response personnel

Unsuitable eating habits
Dieting
Genetic manipulation—animals
Biotechnology—ingredients in products*
Deliberate release of genetic engineered
organisms*
Food processing and distribution*
Charcoal broiled steak
Food coloring

Forestry*

Dredging and dredge disposal*
Nonpoint source discharges to surface
water*
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Table 2. Continued

Risk Categories (18) and
Subcategories (92)
Drinking water pollution risks
Groundwater pollution risks
Air pollution risks not elsewhere classiﬁed
Outdoor air pollution risks

Indoor air pollution risks
Noise risks
Land pollution risks not elsewhere
classiﬁed
Solid and hazardous waste risks
Nonhazardous waste risks
Pollution risks not elsewhere
classiﬁed
11.

ENERGY PRODUCTION RISKS
Nuclear power risks
Natural gas risks
Hydroelectric power risks
Solar power risks
Geothermal power risks
Non-ionizing radiation risks
Other electric power risks
Fossil fuel risks

100 Representative Risks

Carbon monoxide*
Smog*
Sulfur dioxide*
Air pollution*

Industrial chemical release*
Urban pollution*

Oil reﬁneries*
Transport of oil—transcontinental
pipelines*
Liquid propane trains

12.

POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND FINANCIAL RISKS
Financial risks
Political risks
Social risks
Social/ethical/cultural impacts of
technology*
Political, social, and ﬁnancial risks not
elsewhere classiﬁed

13.

ECOGEOLOGICAL RISKS
Storm risks
Earthquakes and other land risks
Organisms other than humans risks
Weather related risks, other than storms
Solar and background radiation risks
Volcano risks
Wildﬁre risks
Ecogeological risks not elsewhere classiﬁed

14.

GLOBAL RISKS
Climate change/Greenhouse effect risks
Stratospheric ozone depletion risks
Biodiversity and habitat risks
Asteroids/near earth objects risks

Termites attacking fruit crops
Flooding of dikes*

Sea level rise
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Table 2. Continued

Risk Categories (18) and
Subcategories (92)
15.

HUMAN DISEASE/HEALTH RISKS
Cancer risks
Cardiovascular risks
Infectious disease risks
Pulmonary risks
Other physical illness risks not elsewhere
classiﬁed
Mental health risks
Other health risks (not elsewhere classiﬁed)

16.

OCCUPATIONAL RISKS
Occupational health and safety risks

Service industry risks

Manufacturing risks

Other occupational risks not elsewhere
classiﬁed

17.

18.

CONSUMER PRODUCT RISKS
Appliance risks
Information technology risks
Consumer product risks not elsewhere
classiﬁed

100 Representative Risks

Mononucleosis
West Nile virus*
Heat stroke*
Cognitive disorders*
Sleep
Genes—defects predisposing to illness
Gallbladder
Neurologic malfunction
Biological agents—pet hair, skin, and
excreta
Occupationally acquired infections of the
lung
Occupational carcinogens*
Workplace violence*
Ergonomics—sleep deprivation*
Safety culture and management
Jewelry
Laboratory worker
Hotels and restaurants—health effects and
disease patterns*
Engineer (deaths)
Rubber manufacture—ergonomics
Semiconductor manufacturing
Woodworking*
Work at high altitudes
CEO deaths
Workplace—performance measures and
compensation
Safety and health training*
Stone quarries*
Television
Carpets and rugs

CONSTRUCTION RISKS

*Note: As of September 2008, the ﬁve research questions described in the text have been
answered for these ﬁfty-eight risks by student researchers, to the extent described in the text.
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Table 3. 18 Risk Categories

Category

1 Crime and violence
2 Alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs
3 Medication and medical treatment
4 Transportation
5 Accident risks not elsewhere classiﬁed
6 Recreation
7 War, security, and terrorism
8 Toxic substances
9 Food and agriculture
10 Pollution
11 Energy production
12 Political, social, and ﬁnancial
13 Ecogeological
14 Global
15 Human disease/health
16 Occupational
17 Consumer products
18 Construction
Total percentage
Total number

Percentage in
Matrix

Sample

1.8
3.0
6.8
8.2
2.4
5.5
1.5
9.8
9.5
7.5
5.0
3.4
4.0
2.2
9.7
15.0
3.4
1.4
100.0
2,878

3
3
8
13
2
8
3
8
9
8
3
1
2
1
9
17
2
0
100
100

Table 3 previously appeared in Hammitt et al. (2005).

C. 100 RANDOMLY SELECTED RISKS

Recognizing that we could not possibly study all risks in the risk universe,
we constructed the risk matrix so that we could select a subset of representative
risks to study. To get a representative subset of risks, we drew a simple
random sample of 100 risks from the ﬁnal matrix of 2,878 unique risks.12 The
random sample appears to be highly representative of our universe of unique
risks, as indicated by a chi-square test and by the sample’s distribution
across risk-type categories. A chi-square test provides no evidence to reject
2
the hypothesis that the sample is a random draw from the ﬁnal matrix ( χ17
=
13
13.4, p = 0.7). As shown in Table 1, the sample includes risks from all
eighteen major risk-type categories except one, construction, which has the
smallest number of unique risks and hence the smallest probability of being
sampled. The largest number of risks (seventeen) comes from the largest
category, occupational risks. The difference between the percentage of the random sample of 100 and the percentage of the matrix of 2,878 is 2.5 percentage
points or less for all categories except transportation, which includes 13
percent of the random sample but only 8.2 percent of the matrix, a difference of 4.8 percentage points. The randomly selected risks span about half
of the ninety-two risk subcategories, as can be seen in Table 2.
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III. CHARACTERIZING RELATIVE U.S. AND EUROPEAN REGULATORY
PRECAUTION

While we recognized that study of the assessment and regulation of these
representative risks would answer a wide range of questions about regulatory
behavior, the question we initially sought to answer was how precautionary
the United States and Europe were relative to each other regarding the
regulation of these risks. This section outlines our ﬁrst efforts to characterize
relative precaution and summarizes our ﬁndings thus far. The balance of
the article then suggests how the matrix can be used to theorize and generalize
about risk assessment and regulation, utilizing purposive and random
sampling of matrix risks. In this further discussion we will occasionally
refer back to this initial analysis of relative regulatory precaution.
To evaluate relative precaution between the United States and Europe,
we compared regulation of the 100 randomly selected risks from 1970
through 2004. The ﬁrst step was to gather all relevant regulatory information
for each of the sampled risks in both regions over the past thirty-five years. The
goal was to collect information about all major regulations, including date
of enactment, quantitative measures of stringency, narrative legal language,
expressions of or allusions to the Precautionary Principle or precaution,
and other relevant information. Researchers scoured numerous sources for
such information, including U.S. statutes, the Federal Register, and the
Code of Federal Regulations; U.S. state laws and regulations; EU legislation,
directives, and regulations; European national (member state) laws and
regulations; judicial decisions (case law) in these jurisdictions; and scholarly
commentaries, the World Wide Web, and library catalogs and databases.
For each risk, a dossier was prepared synthesizing this research and scoring
relative precaution over the thirty-five-year period. Challenges encountered
in assembling and assessing this information and the ways in which we tried
to address those challenges are discussed in greater detail in Hammitt et al.
(2005) and Swedlow et al. (forthcoming).
We evaluated the information on U.S. and European regulations to
determine which polity was more precautionary in each year from 1970 to
2004. We measured precaution by two components: earliness and stringency
(Wiener 2002: 1513–14). The polity that regulates a risk earlier and more
stringently than the other is considered more precautionary. We developed
a comparison of the stringency of existing regulations in each year from
1970 through 2004. Regulations were analyzed by the date of enactment,
not the date of implementation. This choice reﬂects which region ﬁrst took
action. Neither compliance nor effectiveness of regulations was considered
in this task due to the extreme time and effort required to evaluate those
highly contextual attributes. Our results thus reﬂect announced standards
more than actual standards in practice. If there is a systematic tendency of
one legal system to use more precautionary language, but to enforce that
language less stringently than the other legal system, our scoring results
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would reﬂect the language alone. Our comparison of regulatory stringency
is purely categorical. In each year, we judge whether the United States
or Europe has the more stringent regulation, but we did not attempt to
distinguish cases where one regulation is only slightly more stringent than
another from cases where one regulation is much more stringent than the
other. We also did not attempt to determine the date at which information
or awareness about a risk began to arise, and so we cannot compare
earliness of regulation, relative to emerging information, across risks. Nor
could we assess relative precaution in terms of earliness of regulation
compared to the eventual manifestation of a risk.
For each year, a polity received one point if its overall regulation of a
particular risk is more stringent than regulation in the other polity in that
year. The score for a year is +1 if the European regulations are more
stringent, −1 if the U.S. regulations are more stringent, and 0 if the regulations are equally stringent or if we were unable to determine which are
more stringent. Therefore, positive scores represent greater European
precaution, and negative scores represent greater U.S. precaution. Each risk
received a score for each of the thirty-five years from 1970 through 2004.
The more stringent (and thus precautionary) polity receives one point every
year until a change in regulation occurs. When a change occurs, we evaluate
how the change inﬂuences relative stringency. This approach automatically
incorporates the earliness component because if one polity regulated a risk
before the other, then until the second polity started to regulate that risk,
the former is considered more precautionary. We calculated the average
score for each risk over time, which is bounded between −1 and +1. An
average score at the boundary of −1 or +1 would be achieved for a risk
where the U.S. regulations were more stringent than the European regulations in all thirty-five years, and a risk where the European regulations were
more stringent than the U.S. regulations in all thirty-five years, respectively.
We developed conﬁdence weights to indicate our degree of assurance about
which polity had the more stringent regulations in each year. The conﬁdence
weights range from 0 to 3, with 0 representing no conﬁdence and 3 representing
very high conﬁdence in the relative-precaution score. Weighted scores were
calculated for each year as the product of the conﬁdence weight and the
precaution score and normalized so the weighted scores are bounded by −1
and +1. This approach gives less weight to precaution scores that may be less
reliable due to incomplete information. We prefer to rely on the conﬁdenceweighted scores rather than the unweighted scores, as the conﬁdenceweighted scores provide a more accurate picture of our judgments about
relative precaution. To evaluate overall precaution and trends in precaution,
we averaged the weighted and unweighted scores across risks.
Scores were assigned by two of the authors (Kall and Zhou), working
independently. As described in Hammitt et al. (2005) and Swedlow et al.
(forthcoming), the two sets of scores are similar, which provides some
evidence for the reliability of the scoring process. The two sets of scores and
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conﬁdence weights were combined to provide a single set of consensus
scores and conﬁdence weights for analysis (consensus weighted scores for
each risk and year are the product of the corresponding consensus
conﬁdence weight and consensus score). In cases where the researchers
assigned the same score or weight, that value became the consensus value.
In cases where they assigned different values, the consensus value was
achieved by discussion. This method permited sharing information and
understanding between the researchers. Empirically, the consensus values
are similar to a simple average of the two scores.

IV. SUMMARY OF TRENDS IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN REGULATORY
PRECAUTION, 1970–2004

This section summarizes our estimates (developed in Hammitt et al. 2005
and Swedlow et al. forthcoming) of the extent to which one or the other
region has exhibited more precautionary regulation of these representative
risks, reporting both average trends and trends for each of the 100 risks
over the thirty-five-year period. The risks take on nine of ten possible trends.
Relative regulatory precaution or stringency is of course only one regulatory area where the United States and Europe may be similar or different.
And to describe trends is not to explain their causes or to assess their
consequences. This summary of trends in relative regulatory precaution is
consequently merely meant to be illustrative of the kind of systematic,
generally valid results that can be obtained by studying our representative
sample of regulatory activities.
Figure 1 shows the resulting patterns for the average of the 100 risks.
The results are weakly consistent with David Vogel’s (2001, 2003) ﬂip-ﬂop
hypothesis. The unweighted score suggests that the United States exhibited
greater precaution than Europe from 1970 through the late 1980s, including increasing relative U.S. precaution during 1980–89, and that Europe
became relatively more precautionary during the 1990s and early 2000s.
The conﬁdence-weighted score suggests a relatively static balance of relative
precaution from 1970 through the late 1980s, followed by increasing
relative precaution in Europe during the 1990s and early 2000s. In contrast
to the unweighted score, the weighted score is uniformly greater than zero,
suggesting Europe was more precautionary on average in the 1970s as
well as in later periods. Both scores, but especially the unweighted values,
suggest a shift toward greater relative precaution in the United States
during the 1980s, but the estimated magnitude of the change in average
relative precaution is quite modest.
A complementary method for evaluating patterns of relative precaution is
to identify a set of possible patterns and investigate how many risks are
consistent with each pattern. Figure 2 reports the number of risks in our
sample of 100 that are consistent with each of ten alternative patterns (using
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Figure 1. Trends in Relative Precaution (All Risks). Figure 1 previously appeared in
Hammitt et al. (2005).

Figure 2. Patterns of Relative Precaution. Figure 2 previously appeared in Hammitt
et al. (2005).

the unweighted scores). By far the most common pattern we identiﬁed
(accounting for thirty-three risks) is that the United States and Europe are
equally precautionary over the thirty-five-year period. To some extent, this
ﬁnding of equal precaution reﬂects our inability to obtain full information
about regulations in each region, and to make conﬁdent judgments about
which of two sets of multidimensional regulations is, on balance, more
stringent. But even excluding those risks we could not score for lack of
information, equal precaution remains the modal pattern, at twenty-one risks.
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Patterns reﬂecting a difference but no change in the direction of relative
precaution are also common, accounting for twenty risks. These cases are
almost exactly divided between the eleven cases where Europe appears to be
more precautionary over the entire period and nine cases where the United
States appears to be more precautionary. Of the cases in which there was a
change in relative precaution, the change is more often toward greater relative
precaution in Europe, but even here many cases show the opposite result. The
direction of movement was toward greater relative precaution in Europe for
twenty-one cases and toward greater relative precaution in the United
States for fourteen cases. Only ﬁve cases took on Vogel’s ﬂip-ﬂop pattern.
A fuller comparison of regulatory approaches would require collecting
more information about how and why and with what results these risks are
assessed and regulated the way they are. The next three sections describe
steps that are being taken and might be taken to collect additional information on the assessment and regulation of matrix risks and to test and build
theories of risk assessment and regulation.

V. CONTINUING THEORY-GUIDED RESEARCH ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND
REGULATION OF MATRIX RISKS

Social scientists generally agree that data gathering should be guided by
theory (see, e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Brady and Collier 2004;
Coppedge 1999, 2005, 2007; and Lieberman 2003, 2005). Since we cannot
possibly study everything about subjects like risk assessment and regulation,
the argument goes, we need theory to focus our empirical inquiries, to tell
us what is important to study and what can be set aside. Social scientists
also generally agree that theories should be as broadly stated as possible:
general theories are preferable to theories of restricted range (King, Keohane,
and Verba 1994). And that to validate broad, general theories, they need to
be tested on data of equally broad range (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).
Students of risk assessment and regulation have developed three general
types of theories of regulation—public, private, and institutionalist theories—
with several variants (surveyed in Morgan and Yeung 2007). However, students
of risk assessment and regulation have not yet been able to test their broad
theories on equally extensive data and certainly not on extensive representative
data of high quality. The preponderance of general theories of risk
assessment and regulation makes it difﬁcult to ﬁnd collaborators with
shared theoretical interests, while collecting data to test regulatory theories of
such broad scope would appear to require such collaboration. What, if
anything, can be done to advance regulatory studies under these circumstances? Is there any common ground that suggests a way forward?
We think that there is. According to the authors of a recent text surveying
the ﬁeld, theories of regulation may be conceived of as expecting different
answers to a common set of empirical questions:
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A theory of regulation is a set of propositions or hypotheses about why
regulation emerges, which actors contribute to that emergence and typical
patterns of interaction between regulatory actors, [where]. . . . regulation is
seen as encompassing all forms of social control, whether intentional or not,
and whether imposed by the state or other social institutions. (Morgan and
Yeung 2007: 3 – 4, 16; emphases in original)

If research questions can be framed in ways that allow these empirical
questions to be answered, then perhaps enough scholars will collaborate to
answer them for a sufﬁciently broad range of regulatory activities to test
various general theories of regulation.
Other regulatory scholars have suggested that in all regulatory systems
There must be some capacity for standard-setting, to allow a distinction to be
made between more or less preferred states of the system. There must also be
some capacity for information-gathering or monitoring to produce knowledge
about current or changing states of the system. On top of that must be some
capacity for behaviour-modiﬁcation to change the state of the system (Hood,
Rothstein, and Baldwin, 2001: 23; also quoted with approval in Morgan and
Yeung 2007: 3; emphases in original).

If all regulatory systems indeed share these characteristics, then general
theories of risk assessment and regulation should seek to explain similarities
and differences in standard setting, information gathering, and behavior
modiﬁcation. And, again, these shared features point toward the possibility
of posing a common set of empirical research questions.
One of us (Swedlow) has developed ﬁve empirical questions about risk
assessment and regulation, the answers to which will answer the foregoing
empirical questions that should be common to all general theories of risk
assessment and regulation:
(1) How is the risk deﬁned and assessed?
How do different public and private actors, including experts, interest groups,
the media, and government agencies, deﬁne and assess the risk?
(2) Who regulates the risk?
What public and private actors, including international regulatory and nongovernmental organizations, and federal, state, regional, county, and city level
governments, regulate this risk?
(3) How is the risk regulated?
What statutes, regulations, judicial decisions, executive orders, legislative
oversight, economic and other incentives, information provision and other
policy instruments, discretionary actions, customs, or norms are used to
regulate the risk?
(4) Why is the risk assessed and regulated the way that it is?
What political, economic, cultural, organizational, ideological, scientiﬁc,
psychological, and other factors cause the risk to be assessed and regulated the
way that it is?
(5) What are the consequences of assessing and regulating the risk the way that
it is?
Is the risk reduced or eliminated as a result of regulation? Does regulating,
reducing, or eliminating this risk, decrease, increase, or create other risks?14
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Initial answers to these questions are being gained through case
studies executed by students as research papers in Swedlow’s graduate and
undergraduate courses. Each student is asked to answer these ﬁve questions
about one of the 100 representative risks. Research and interview guides that
specify and elaborate what the answers to these ﬁve questions should contain
are provided to student researchers. So far, the research guide is fourteen
single-spaced pages and the interview guide is nine pages.
To this point, more guidance has been provided for answering descriptive
questions 1–3, than causal questions 4–5. Guidance for question 4 consists
of some operationalization of competing political cultural and economic
theories regarding differences in risk assessment and regulation,15 as well
as a list of potential causes and consequences of risk assessment and
regulation culled from the literature (to answer questions 4 and 5, respectively), a list that was also given to scholars comparing precautionary cases
in Wiener et al. (forthcoming). This listing is meant to sensitize student
researchers to potential causes and consequences they might encounter in
researching the assessment and regulation of their risks.
So far, this guidance has proved adequate to directing students to obtain
comparable information regarding those aspects of descriptive questions
1–3 that are easiest to answer and therefore are being answered ﬁrst in their
research papers. Once these three questions are answered, additional
guidance can be provided for answering questions 4–5, according to the
theoretical interests of collaborating faculty.
Because students are answering these ﬁve questions with thickly described
case study narratives (in which the ﬁve research questions serve as
headings) rather than entering their answers into a spreadsheet, explanatory
variables do not need to be classiﬁed at the outset as political, economic,
cultural, organizational, ideological, scientiﬁc, or psychological. The same is
true for other variables, including the consequences of risk assessment and
regulation. Narrative case study contents can be classiﬁed by subsequent
researchers in any way they wish. The information in these comparable case
study narratives can be transformed into quantitative form by scoring the
narratives on the answers to the ﬁve questions (or on any other criteria that
the answers will support). In other words, the methods we used to score
relative U.S. and European precaution can be extended to this data. As
discussed in the introduction, exemplars of such scoring methods applied to
case studies of risk assessment and regulation also can be found in Hood,
Rothstein, and Baldwin (2001) and Mazur (2004). Mazur’s methods are
discussed further in Swedlow (2005) and Swedlow et al. (forthcoming).
Answers to these ﬁve research questions will also allow answers to empirical
questions common to all general theories of regulation, as discussed above.
That is, answers to questions 2–4 will answer questions common to all
theories regarding “why regulation emerges, which actors contribute to that
emergence and typical patterns of interaction between regulatory actors.”
And answers to questions 1, 3, and 5 will answer, respectively, questions
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy

256

LAW & POLICY

April 2009

about information gathering, standard setting, and behavior modiﬁcation.
It is also important to emphasize that in addition to providing answers to
theoretical questions, answers to these ﬁve questions will answer many
descriptive questions of interest to a broad range of risk, regulatory, and
other scholars.
Our study of relative U.S. and European regulatory precaution, for
example, will be advanced by this ongoing study because it allows us to
investigate whether the precautionary similarities and differences we
ﬁnd extend from adopted standards (the “law on the books”) to their
implementation, including enforcement and compliance (the “law in
action”); whether these precautionary similarities and differences are
the same for deﬁnitions of precaution that differ from the one we used,
allowing, for example, investigation of the relationship between risk
assessment and regulation; whether these precautionary similarities and
differences are the same within the United States and Europe at the level
of member states and other political jurisdictions as they appear to be
between the two regions; and, very importantly, this ongoing study will
allow us to investigate the causes and consequences of any precautionary
similarities and differences we ﬁnd. Finally, this ongoing study creates a
basis for extending our study of precautionary regulation to other polities
around the world.
In the ongoing study, Swedlow’s students are asked to focus on how
matrix risks are assessed and regulated in the United States at the federal
level, and in Illinois at the state and local level. This allows us to utilize
proximity and language skills, which facilitates the study of implementation
and lays the groundwork for comparisons of member states and other
political jurisdictions, such as counties and cities.
The ﬁrst three of our ﬁve research questions have been provisionally
answered for fifty-eight of the 100 representative risks for the United States
and Illinois, with answers to questions 2 and 3 generally being more developed
than answers to question 1. Several of the risks have been studied more than
once—sometimes by the same student, other times by different students—
deepening the answers to these questions, sometimes by going beyond Internet
and library research to interview local regulators and regulatees regarding
implementation of and compliance with regulations.
When collaborators join this research effort, it will be able to take on a
“horizontal” comparative aspect, as faculty in other U.S. states and in
Europe enlist their students in studying these same risks in their political
jurisdictions, answering the same ﬁve questions about them.
A. THEORY-TESTING AND -BUILDING THROUGH COMPARATIVE NESTED
ANALYSIS OF MATRIX RISKS

Scholars interested in using the matrix to test and build theories of risk
assessment and regulation can also use the matrix to exploit advances in
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comparative research methods. Political science methodologists have
recently proposed ways to combine quantitative and qualitative research
approaches so that they leverage each others’ strengths and offset each
others’ weaknesses (see, e.g., Ragin 1987, 2000; Tarrow 1995; Coppedge
1999, 2005, 2007; Lieberman 2003, 2005; Bennett 2002; Brady, Collier, and
Seawright 2004; and Seawright and Gerring 2008). These methods will be
very helpful for theory-testing and -building regarding the assessment and
regulation of matrix risks, and they also will help accelerate the gathering
of data on matrix risks by providing rationales for selecting particular risks
or risk categories or subcategories for intensive study and by providing
guidance in interpreting the implications of these case studies. These are
purposive rather than random methods of case selection, and they are also
types of nested inference or analysis of cases.
Seawright and Gerring (2008) provide an extensive “menu” of purposive
case selection techniques all of which begin with some quantitative
analysis but do not require in-depth familiarity with each case. They deﬁne
typical, diverse, extreme, deviant, inﬂuential, most-similar, and mostdifferent cases and explain how to identify such cases within a large-N
population, how each type of case can be used to test or build theory, and
in what way(s) each type of case is representative of other cases. All of
these case selection techniques can be used to select matrix cases, but
only four will be discussed here to illustrate the potential the matrix
holds for exploiting these techniques and to suggest how studies of risk
assessment and regulation may be advanced by using them. Purposive case
selection methods to be discussed here include variants of typical, deviant, most-similar, and most-different case selection techniques. We use
our ﬁndings on relative U.S. and European precaution for 1970–2004 to
illustrate how these case selection techniques might be operationalized using
matrix cases.
We begin with most-similar and most-different research designs. Since we
know which risks (and which risk categories) are most-similar and mostdifferent in relative regulatory precaution, we can use that knowledge to
select risks or risk categories for study. For example, researchers might
expect risks within categories to be regulated by the same set of actors and
institutions operating under similar conditions, so that where risks
within a category are regulated with differences in relative precaution or
other variables of interest, it should be relatively easy to pinpoint which one
or few variables led to these differences.
A number of categories displayed signiﬁcant within-category variation in
precautionary regulation, with one or more risks regulated with greater
precaution by the United States and one or more risks regulated with
greater precaution by Europe. Of the three risks (burglary, sabotage, and
ﬁrearms) falling in the crime and violence risks category, for example,
burglary is regulated with greater precaution by the United States, while
ﬁrearms are regulated with greater precaution by Europe. Why is this so?
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Whatever the reason(s), variation in regulatory agencies and actors are not
likely to be prominent among them. As this example illustrates, categories
can serve as controls for studying regulatory variation within them.
Subcategories of risks should provide even more signiﬁcant controls. Why,
for example, are childbearing risks regulated with greater precaution by
Europe, while radiation therapy is regulated with greater precaution by
the United States? Both of these risks are in the subcategory of medical
procedure risks and are therefore likely to be regulated by the same
institutions and actors, so the causes of these regulatory differences probably
lie elsewhere.
Conversely, where researchers are interested in understanding how a
series of differences compound to maximize differences in precaution or
other aspects of regulatory behavior, they can investigate risks in categories
that are likely to be regulated by distinct actors and institutions operating
under dissimilar conditions and focus on those risks across these categories
that were regulated with the greatest differences in precaution.16 For
example, alcohol, tobacco, and other drug risks are regulated by the
United States with a greater “precautionary margin” over Europe than
exhibited by the United States or Europe for any other category of risk.
Meanwhile, war, security, and terrorism risks are regulated by Europe with
a greater precautionary margin over the United States than Europe displays
for any other category of risks. The three risks (sake, smoking regulations, and pot smoking) falling in the alcohol, tobacco, and other drug
risks category are regulated with very similar differences in precaution.
Consequently, there is more variation to explain between these two categories
than among the individual risks within the alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs
category.17 Thus, one might ask why this category of risks is regulated with
greater precaution by the United States, while war, security, and terrorism
risks are regulated with greater precaution by Europe. Whatever the
answer, it probably has something to do with differences in regulatory agencies
and actors.
This same logic should apply to studying, explaining, and understanding
the consequences of regulatory similarities and differences other than
precautionary ones.
Additional purposive case selection methods can be found in the “nested
inference” proposed and practiced by Coppedge and Lieberman (and
endorsed by Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004) as a way of productively
combining quantitative and qualitative research methods. This type of
nested inference or analysis is the result of selecting typical and/or deviant
cases to study from Seawright and Gerring’s menu.
In a compelling demonstration of the power of this technique, Coppedge
operationalizes existing economic and regional explanations for democratic
development with existing quantitative data and shows that these variables
explain a signiﬁcant portion of the democratic decline in Venezuela. Coppedge
then turns his attention to explaining those aspects of Venezuela’s democratic
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deterioration that are not accounted for in the quantitative analysis. This
“residual” decline is best explained by a series of interconnected institutions,
actors, and events unique to Venezuela, analyzed in typical qualitative fashion. Coppedge then restates these Venezuelan causes for democratic decline
in more general terms, specifying when and how existing explanations for
democratic decline may need to be modiﬁed to account for cases similar to
Venezuela (Coppedge 2005).
For his part, Lieberman (2005) seeks to turn Coppedge’s demonstration
of nested inference and Lieberman’s own efforts at such inference (2003)
into more generally applicable (and operational) guidance on blending
quantitative and qualitative approaches in fruitful ways. Like Coppedge’s
approach, Lieberman’s “nested analysis” “combines the statistical analysis
of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more
cases contained in the large sample” (Lieberman 2005: 435–36). In both
approaches, preliminary statistical analysis is used to test rival theories or
explanations for patterns in the sample. If the statistical analysis allows
the researcher to rule out particular theories, Lieberman proposes that
“model-testing” case studies from the sample be used to establish that
statistically correlated variables are indeed causally related (through
“process-tracing”). These “typical” cases are “on-line cases” in a regression
analysis. If the statistical analysis cannot rule out rival explanations,
“model-building” case studies from the sample are used to specify rival (or
new) explanations in ways that will allow them to be tested by further
statistical analysis of the sample. These “deviant” cases are “off-line cases”
in a regression analysis.
Both Coppedge and Lieberman begin their forms of nested analysis
by operationalizing theory with existing quantitative data. “Indeed,
the very feasibility of nested analysis is a product of the increasing
availability of datasets produced by other scholars and international
organizations, obviating the need for signiﬁcant independent data collection, at least at this preliminary stage [of the nested analysis],” Lieberman notes (2005: 438). Coppedge, by contrast, while relying on
existing data for his nested analysis of Venezuelan democratic decline,
believes that fruitfully combining quantitative and qualitative
approaches will require researchers to “collect different data and more
data and do it more systematically and rigorously” (Coppedge 1999:
465). “The lack of high quality data for large samples is the main reason
why the potential of large-N comparisons has not been realized more
fully.” Quantitative analysts’ “units of analysis are countries and years,
at best” (ibid.: 473–74).
Our data set has some of the characteristics that both Lieberman and
Coppedge ascribe to existing data sets, and it has the potential to become
the kind of high quality data set Coppedge envisions. The more information is
collected across data-set cases through case-study narratives answering our
ﬁve research questions, the more capacity the data set will have to support
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nested analysis of and theorizing and generalizing about risk assessment
and regulation. If quantitative data exist that will allow the investigation of
hypothesized relationships between risk assessment and regulation and
their causes, consequences, or other correlates, that data should be used to
conduct those investigations. If, however, quantitative data do not exist that
will allow the investigation of hypothesized relationships, as Coppedge thinks is
commonly true, then researchers may wish to collect data on matrix risks
to facilitate such analysis. We found ourselves in the latter situation
when we tried to study the relative regulatory precaution of the United States
and Europe. There were no data sets that we could identify that would
allow us to conduct such a study. This is why we constructed the risk matrix.
It may be worth noting here that while the more readily obtained
answers to research questions 1–3 may be thought of as mostly descriptive
in character, they will permit causal analysis of certain relationships and
hence can form the basis for selecting model-testing and model-building
cases in the way outlined by Lieberman. Most obviously, answers to
questions 1 and 3—how is the risk deﬁned, assessed, and regulated?—will
allow analysis of the relationship between risk assessment and regulation. If
we begin with the baseline hypothesis, as Hood and colleagues do (2001),
that more dangerous risks will be regulated more severely, then we can
examine cases that conform to this expectation (to see if this is the real
reason assessment and regulation are in alignment) as well as those that
deviate from it (to see what other inﬂuences may be at work). The former
are model-testing case studies, the latter model-building case studies. To the
extent other inﬂuences are responsible for observed regulatory behavior
(e.g., interest groups) student researchers can be directed to collect data
on those inﬂuences across the 100 risks rather than on the larger set of
potential inﬂuences, focusing and thereby accelerating the data collection
effort. A new model including these inﬂuences should better explain the
relationship between risk assessment and regulation and the causes of
regulation. And it too can be tested and further developed by another
iteration of case selection of both typical or model-testing cases and deviant
or model-building cases. This process will help identify further important
inﬂuences on regulation (perhaps market failure, public opinion, or political
culture). Student researchers can then be directed to collect data on those
particular inﬂuences rather than on a wider range of potential causes,
leading to the construction of improved theory and another round of nested
analysis of cases that are typical or deviant from the perspective of that
theory, and so on.
B. THEORY-TESTING AND -BUILDING THROUGH FURTHER RANDOM
SAMPLING OF MATRIX RISKS

Finally, it should be noted that our sample of 100 representative risks does
not exhaust the possible uses of random sampling to advance theory-testing
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and -building regarding risk assessment and regulation. Additional samples
of both larger and smaller size might be drawn to advance various kinds
of studies, including the ones discussed here. Clearly, larger samples of
perhaps 200–500 cases would increase the power of statistical inferences
about risk assessment and regulation of matrix risks. Larger samples also
would allow inferences to be made about the assessment and regulation of
risk categories and subcategories that presently have too few of the 100
risks in them to support such inferences. The primary reason not to draw a
larger sample is the amount of effort it would take to study a larger number
of cases. However, that challenge might be met by more focused data
collection resulting from nested analysis of the 100 cases and by a division
of labor among a larger number of student researchers, when collaborating
faculty and their students join this effort.
Smaller samples might also be drawn, perhaps of twenty-five to sixty
cases, in a second stage of sampling from the 100 risks. A smaller sample
would continue to support inferences about the assessment and regulation of
matrix risks, but would allow even fewer, if any, inferences to be made
about categories and subcategories of risks. However, a second stage sample
of sixty risks would probably be sufﬁcient to support theory-testing and
-building and generalizations about ecological, health, and safety risk categories that have over fifty risks each in them (see Table 1). The main reason
to take a second, smaller random sample from the 100 cases is that it would
accelerate data collection in the absence of achieving a more focused collection of data through nested analysis. Such an approach would also be likely
to keep a wider set of scholars engaged in conducting this research, since a
broader set of data can more easily be collected about a smaller number of
risks. Also, a smaller, second stage sample would continue to support
nested analysis, perhaps accelerating its contribution to focusing the data
collection effort.
The matrix’s categories and subcategories of risk also permit various
kinds of stratiﬁed random sampling. For example, we have already randomly
drawn but have not yet attempted to study the assessment and regulation of
one risk from each of the ninety-two risk subcategories. Another stratiﬁed
sampling technique would use the risk categories and subcategories to conduct multistage sampling. For example, twenty to twenty-five risk subcategories could be selected at random from the ninety-two risk subcategories,
and then perhaps twenty risks could be selected randomly from each of these
subcategories. This two-stage sample would allow strong inferences to be
made about the twenty to twenty-five risk subcategories as well as preserve
the ability to make inferences about the overall risk matrix. Also, the inferential power of these cases could be increased by allowing those risks that
might be classiﬁed as ﬁtting in more than one category to support inferences
about all categories to which they could be assigned. This would be consistent with the classiﬁcation of ecological, health, and safety risks, which were
not treated as mutually exclusive categories.
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Random samples drawn by any of these methods would continue to
provide a basis for the nested analysis purposive sampling techniques just
described.

VI. CONCLUSION

We believe, and hope that other scholars will agree, that the risk matrix
creates unprecedented opportunities to advance theorizing and generalizing
about risk assessment and regulation through comparative nested analysis
of representative cases. We invite other scholars of regulatory behavior to
think about how to use the risk matrix to answer research questions of
interest to them.
To preserve the ability to theorize and generalize about risk assessment
and regulation and not just about particular aspects of regulatory behavior,
such as precautionary regulation, and to allow testing of many theories and
not just one or a few, our inclination is to proceed along three interrelated
research tracks.
On one track, Swedlow will continue to enlist his students in answering
the ﬁve empirical research questions outlined above for each of the 100
randomly selected risks for U.S. federal and Illinois state and local regulation.
On this research track, answers to questions 2 and 3—who regulates the
risk and how the risk is assessed and regulated—will probably emerge ﬁrst
for the 100 risks. Answers to questions 1, how the risk is deﬁned and
assessed, and 4 and 5, what the causes and consequences of assessing and
regulating the risk are, will require more ﬁeldwork and therefore more
money and time. (This is also true regarding gaining answers to questions 2
and 3 with respect to gathering information on implementation of regulations.)
On a second research track, consequently, we suggest a more focused
research effort. To the extent sufﬁcient theory and data are available to
conduct nested analysis, such analysis can be used to select a few of the 100
cases for in depth study. If purposive sampling is not immediately possible
or desired, a second stage of sampling of perhaps twenty-five to sixty of the
100 representative risks could help focus the research effort, allowing archival research and interviews to ﬂesh out the answers to the ﬁve research
questions for these risks more quickly than for the 100 risks.
On a third research track, we would suggest enlisting collaborators in other
political jurisdictions who could replicate the study of the 100 risks and
either nested analysis or study of the twenty-five to sixty randomly selected
risks along these two tracks. This would maintain a cross-country, crossstate comparative aspect in this research, allowing theory-testing and generalizations about risk assessment and regulation across political jurisdictions.
As theories are reﬁned and as data become available, the roles of the
various causal variables and the extent of particular consequences can then
be read off these case studies in a scoring effort that will compress all this
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information and convert it to a quantitative form allowing further statistical
analysis. This is consistent with Lieberman’s vision of successive iterations
of “large N” and “small N” analysis that inform each other and further
specify and test rival theoretical explanations. This iterative process of
theory-testing and -building should allow researchers to assess the relative
explanatory power of the public, private, and institutionalist theories
surveyed by Morgan and Yeung (2007), and the market failure, public
opinion, interest group, and political cultural explanations investigated by
Hood, Rothstein, and Baldwin (2001), among others.
Of course, some theories and concepts will undoubtedly need to be
operationalized in ways that cannot be captured by coding rules developed
and applied retroactively to the data generated by case studies answering
the ﬁve questions. Some research questions will surely require gathering
additional information regarding risks already studied or the selection of
additional risks to study, perhaps by one of the methods outlined above,
perhaps by other methods (see Flyvbjerg 2004 and Swedlow forthcoming
for related discussion). Where possible, gathering of additional information
or selection of these additional risks might be done in ways that build on or
remain in constructive dialogue with information accumulated about risks
already studied. The idea would be to cumulate knowledge and leverage
existing theory and information as much as possible in asking and answering
additional questions about risk assessment and regulation.
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NOTES

1. Cultural theory has been used to explain variation in regulation and administration by a number of scholars (see, e.g., Coyle 1993, 1994; Verweij 2000;
Swedlow 1994, 2002a, 2002b; Hood 1998; Wildavsky 2006; Lodge, Wegrich,
and McElroy 2008) and has emerged as the primary alternative to psychometric
theories in explanations of variations in risk perception (see, e.g., Douglas and
Wildavsky 1982; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Wildavsky 1993; Jenkins-Smith and
Smith 1994; Adams 1995; Ellis and Thompson 1997; Marris, Langford, and
O’Riordan 1998; Slovic et al. 2000; Weber and Hsee 2000; Kahan and Braman
2003; and the ongoing research of the “cultural cognition” group at Yale Law
School (http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition)). For an overview of cultural theory applications to risk assessment and regulation, see the bibliography
in Wildavsky (2006), also available at the cultural theory Web site (http://
users.fmg.uva.nl/vmamadouh/ggct/agate/basics.html).
2. To maintain clarity regarding our methods and results, much of this section and
the next two—Sections II, III, and IV—draws directly from our prior article on
this topic, Hammitt et al. (2005). Where that article or forthcoming work
provides information beyond that discussed here, we so indicate by in-text
citation.
3. The 403 risk lists are not unique, because some were replicated in articles or
book chapters. We include not only tables of risks, but also multiple risks
appearing in ﬁgures, tables of contents, and even risks appearing in text. Case
studies including two or more risks were also included.
4. Citations for these 252 sources can be found at Duke University’s Center
for Environmental Solutions Web site (http://www.env.duke.edu/solutions/
precaution_project.html).
5. We used strict criteria to eliminate as few risks as possible, but some initially
included in the matrix appeared unsuited to regulation (e.g., friend does not
appreciate a gift) or too broad or vague (e.g., lifestyle, children, all accidents,
exposure) to permit study of regulation. We erred on the side of including risks
if we believed it was at all possible to study their regulation, leaving many
difﬁcult-to-study risks in the matrix.
6. For example, “police work” became the common label for risks that appeared
as “policework” and “being a policeman.” More controversial relabeling collapsed
different aspects of the same risk into the relabeled risk. For example, if nuclear
power was selected, a reasonable person would consider nuclear power plants,
nuclear power accidents, radiation from nuclear power plants, employees at
nuclear power plants, residents living near nuclear power plants, and so forth.
Therefore, any unique risk that would clearly be studied if one was studying
nuclear power was labeled as nuclear power. (Nuclear waste risks were kept
distinct from nuclear reactor risks.) Unique risks that were more speciﬁc and
might be considered in a case study were labeled more speciﬁcally. More speciﬁc
risks were usually hyphenated with the more general risk ﬁrst, followed by
speciﬁcs. For example, the unique risk “East European nuclear power plants”
was relabeled as “nuclear power—East European.”
7. Developing a workable approach to constructing a risk universe, assembling the
list of 11,992 verbatim risks from 252 sources, reducing it to 2,878 unique risks,
organizing these into eighteen categories and ninety-two subcategories, coding
the risks on various other characteristics (including environmental, health,
and safety endpoints), and helping develop the sampling strategy, took approximately one year of work by a full-time postdoctoral fellow (Swedlow) and
six part-time research assistants (including Kall). Finalizing the assembly and
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categorization of risks, researching and scoring the sample of 100, and helping
develop the sampling strategy, took an additional year of work by two full-time
graduate research associates (Kall and Zhou), plus a few additional temporary
research assistants.
EPA (2002) deﬁnes ecological/environmental risks as “the potential for adverse
effects on living organisms associated with pollution of the environment by
efﬂuents, emissions, wastes, or accidental chemical releases; energy use; or the
depletion of natural resources.” This deﬁnition includes humans, but not the
abiotic environment. Kolluru’s (1996: 1.11) description of ecological/environmental risks focuses on habitat and ecosystem impacts. Risk characteristics
include “subtle effects, myriad interactions among populations, communities,
and ecosystems (including food chains) at micro and macro level.”
Webster’s Third International Dictionary (1993) deﬁnes health as “the condition
of an organism or one of its parts in which it performs its vital functions
normally or properly: the state of being sound in body or mind.” Similarly, the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2003) deﬁnes health as “a state of
complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of
disease or inﬁrmity.” Koren’s (1996: 191) deﬁnition is comparable: “the
avoidance of disease and injury and the promotion of normalcy through efﬁcient
use of the environment, a properly functioning society, and an inner sense of
well-being.”
We include social and mental well-being for their own sake and where they
inﬂuence physical well-being.
Examples include burglary and social/ethical/cultural impacts of technology.
We relied on Microsoft Excel software to generate the simple random sample of
100 risks.
The chi-square test statistic is the sum over the eighteen categories of (O – E)^2 / E,
where O is the observed number of risks drawn from that category and E is the
expected number if the risks are drawn randomly. From Table 1, for category 1
(crime and violence) the observed number is 3, the expected number is 1.8, and
so the calculation yields 1.2^2 / 1.8 = 0.8. Doing the analogous calculation for
the other 17 categories and summing yields Z = 13.4. Under the hypothesis of
random sampling, Z has a chi-squared distribution with 17 degrees of freedom
(18 bins minus 1, because the sum of the observed frequencies must be 100%).
The p-value is about 0.71, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sample is
a random draw from the population.
Various kinds of risk trade-offs are discussed in Graham and Wiener (1995).
In addition to the cultural theory developed by Mary Douglas, Aaron
Wildavsky, and others cited in note 1, the “post-materialistic” cultural theory
developed by Ronald Inglehart and others (see, e.g., Inglehart 1990; Grendstad
and Selle 1997; Carriere and Scruggs 2001) and the theory of American political
cultures developed by Daniel Elazar and others (see, e.g., Elazar 1986, 1994;
Dran, Albritton, and Wyckoff 1991; Gove and Nowlan 1996) are operationalized
in the students’ research guide.
This technique is not exactly most-different case selection as deﬁned by
Seawright and Gerring (who indicate that the conditions allowing such selection
rarely occur) but comes closer to being a hybrid method combining most-different
selection with John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference,” which seeks to “maximize variance on both the dependent and control variables in order to eliminate
variables that are less likely to exercise a causal effect on the different outcomes
since they appear in both cases” (Levi-Faur 2006: 23). This technique may help
facilitate temporal comparisons, as discussed by Levi-Faur (2004), as well as
study of “path dependent” regulatory developments (such as those analyzed by
Coppedge, discussed below).
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17. Meanwhile, the war, security, and terrorism risks category has signiﬁcant
within-category variation to explain, with antiballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons testing regulated with much greater precaution by Europe than war and
terrorism risks, regarding which the United States is actually slightly more
precautionary than Europe over the period. Here, one might seek to identify the
causes of within-category variation in addition to discovering sources of
between-category variation in regulatory precaution, using the categories as
controls, as discussed above.

REFERENCES

Adams, John (1995) Risk. London: Univ. College London Press.
Axelrod, L. J., T. McDaniels, and Paul Slovic (1999) “Perceptions of Ecological Risk
from Natural Hazards,” Journal of Risk Research 2: 31–53.
Bennett, Andrew (2002) “Where the Model Frequently Meets the Road: Combining
Statistical, Formal, and Case Study Methods,” Presented at the Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
Brady, Henry E., and David Collier (2004) Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools,
Shared Standards. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Public Policy Press and Rowman and
Littleﬁeld.
Carriere, Erin, and Lyle Scruggs (2001) “A Cross-national Study of the Cultural
Sources of Environmental Attitudes: Evidence from the 2000 ISP.” Presented at
the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco,
CA, 29 August–2 September. Available at http://sp.uconn.edu/%7Escruggs/
csenvatt.pdf.
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (2003) Glossary of Epidemiology
Terms. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/epi_gloss.htm#H, 8 May.
Collier, David, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright (2004) “Source of Leverage in
Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology.” In Rethinking
Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards, edited by H. E. Brady & D.
Collier. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Public Policy Press and Rowman and Littleﬁeld.
Coppedge, Michael (1999) “Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining
Large N and Small in Comparative Politics,” Comparative Politics 31: 465–75.
Coppedge, Michael (2005) “Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela
Through Nested Induction.” In The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America,
edited by F. Hagopian & S. Mainwaring. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Coppedge, Michael (2007) “Theory Building and Hypothesis Testing: Large- vs.
Small-N Research on Democratization.” In Regimes and Democracy in Latin
America: Theories and Findings, edited by G. Munck. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Coyle, Dennis J. (1993) Property Rights and the Constitution: Shaping Society through
Land Use Regulation. Albany, NY: State Univ. of New York Press.
Coyle, Dennis J. (1994) “ ‘This Land Is My Land, This Land Is Your Land’: Cultural
Conﬂict in Environmental and Land Use Regulation.” In Politics, Policy, & Culture,
edited by D. J. Coyle & R. J. Ellis. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Dran, Ellen B., Robert B. Albritton, and Mikel Wyckoff. (1991) “Surrogate vs.
Direct Measures of Political Culture: Explaining Participation and Policy Attitudes
in Illinois,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 21: 15–30.
Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky (1982) Risk and Culture: An Essay on the
Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: Univ. of California
Press.
Elazar, Daniel J. (1986) Cities of the Prairie Revisited: The Closing of the Metropolitan
Frontier. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy

Swedlow et al.

THEORIZING AND GENERALIZING 267

Elazar, Daniel J. (1994) The American Mosaic: The Impact of Space, Time and
Culture on American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Ellis, Richard J., and Fred Thompson (1997) “Culture and the Environment in the
Paciﬁc Northwest,” American Political Science Review 91: 885–97.
Englander, Tibor, Klara Farago, Paul Slovic, and Baruch Fischhoff (1986) “A
Comparative Analysis of Risk Perception in Hungary and the United States,”
Social Behaviour 1: 55–66.
Fischhoff, Baruch, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, Stephen Read, and Barbara
Combs (1978) “How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes
Towards Technological Risks and Beneﬁts,” Policy Sciences 9: 127–52.
Flyvbjerg, Bent (2004) “Five Misunderstandings about Case-study Research.” In
Qualitative Research Practice, edited by C. Seale, G. Gobo, J. F. Gubrium & D.
Silverman. London: Sage.
Gove, Samuel K., and James D. Nowlan (1996) Illinois Politics and Government: The
Expanding Metropolitan Frontier. Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press.
Goszczynska, Maryla, Tadeusz Tyska, and Paul Slovic (1991) “Risk Perception in
Poland: A Comparison with Three Other Countries,” Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making 4: 179–93.
Graham, John D., and Jonathan B. Wiener (1995) Risk vs. Risk: Tradeoffs in
Protecting Health and the Environment. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.
Grendstad, Gunnar, and Per Selle (1997) “Cultural Theory, Postmaterialism, and
Environmental Attitudes.” In Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky,
edited by R. J. Ellis & M. Thompson. Boulder, Co: Westview Press.
Hammitt, James K., Jonathan B. Wiener, Brendon Swedlow, Denise Kall, and Zheng
Zhou (2005) “Precautionary Regulation in Europe and the United States: A Quantitative Comparison” Risk Analysis 25: 1215–28.
Hohenemser, C., R. W. Kates, and P. Slovic (1983) “The Nature of Technological
Hazard,” Science 220 (4595): 378–84.
Hood, Christopher (1998) The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public
Management. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Hood, Christopher, Henry Rothstein, and Robert Baldwin (2001). The Government
of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
Inglehart, Ronald (1990) Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton Univ. Press.
Jenkins-Smith, Hank C., and Walter K. Smith (1994) “Ideology, Culture, and Risk
Perception.” In Politics, Policy, and Culture, edited by D. J. Coyle & R. J. Ellis.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Kagan, Robert A. (1995) “What Socio-Legal Scholars Should Do When There Is
Too Much Law to Study,” Journal of Law and Society 22: 140–46.
Kahan, Dan M., and Donald Braman (2003) “More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A
Cultural Theory of Gun Risk Perceptions,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review
151: 1291–325.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994) Designing Social Inquiry:
Scientiﬁc Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
Kolluru, Rao V. (1996) “Risk Assessment and Management: A Uniﬁed Approach.”
In Risk Assessment and Management Handbook: For Environmental Health, and
Safety Professionals, edited by R. Kolluru, S. M. Bartell, R. M. Pitblado, & R. S.
Stricoff. New York: McGraw Hill.
Koren, Herman (1996) Illustrated Dictionary of Environmental Health and Occupational Safety. New York: Lewis Publishers.
Kraus, N. N., and Paul Slovic (1988) “Taxonomic Analysis of Perceived Risk:
Modeling Individual and Group Perceptions within Homogeneous Hazard
Domains,” Risk Analysis 8: 435–55.
Levi-Faur, David (2004) “Comparative Research Designs in the Study of Regulation:
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy

268 LAW & POLICY

April 2009

How to Increase the Number of Cases without Compromising the Strengths of
Case-Oriented Analysis.” In The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory
Reforms in the Age of Governance, edited by J. Jordana & D. Levi-Faur. Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar.
Levi-Faur, David (2006) “A Question of Size? A Heuristic for Stepwise Comparative
Research Design.” In Innovative Comparative Methods for Policy Analysis, edited
by B. Rihoux & H. Grimm. New York: Springer/Kluwer.
Lichtenstein, Sarah, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, Mark Layman, and Barbara
Combs (1978) “Judged Frequency of Lethal Events,” Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Learning and Memory 4: 551–78.
Lieberman, Evan S. (2003) Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil
and South Africa. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Lieberman, Evan S. (2005) “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for
Comparative Research,” American Political Science Review 99: 435–52.
Lodge, Martin, Kai Wegrich, and Gail McElroy (2008) “Gammelﬂeisch Everywhere?
Public Debate, Variety of Worldviews, and Regulatory Change,” ESRC Centre for
Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political
Science.
Marris, Claire, Ian H. Langford, and Timothy O’Riordan (1998) “A Quantitative
Test of the Cultural Theory of Risk Perceptions: Comparison with the Psychometric Paradigm,” Risk Analysis 18: 635–47.
Mazur, Allan (2004) True Warnings and False Alarms: Evaluating Fears about the
Health Risks of Technology, 1948–1971. Washington, DC: Resources for the
Future.
McDaniels, T., L. J. Axelrod, and Paul Slovic (1995) “Characterizing Perception of
Ecological Risk,” Risk Analysis 15: 575–88.
Morgan, M. Granger, H. Keith Florig, Michael DeKay, Paul Fischbeck, Kara
Morgan, Karen Jenni, and Baruch Fischhoff (2000) “Categorizing Risks for Risk
Ranking,” Risk Analysis 20: 49–58.
Morgan, Bronwen, and Karen Yeung (2007) An Introduction to Law and Regulation.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Ragin, Charles C. (1987) The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and
Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
Ragin, Charles C. (2000) Fuzzy Set Social Science. Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago
Press.
Renn, Ortwin, and Bernd Rohrmann (eds.) (2000) Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A
Survey of Empirical Studies. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring (2008) “Case-selection Techniques in Case Study
Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research
Quarterly 61: 294–308.
Slovic, Paul (1987) “Perception of Risk,” Science 236 (4799): 280–85.
Slovic, Paul, James Flynn, C. K. Mertz, Marc Poumadere, and Claire Mays (2000)
“Nuclear Power and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in
France and the United States.” In Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of
Empirical Studies, edited by O. Renn & B. Rohrmann. Dordrecht, Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Swedlow, Brendon (1994) “Cultural Inﬂuences on Policies Concerning Mental Illness.” In Politics, Policy & Culture, edited by D. J. Coyle & R. J. Ellis. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
Swedlow, Brendon (2002a) “Scientists, Judges, and Spotted Owls: Policymakers in
the Paciﬁc Northwest.” Unpublished PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley.
Swedlow, Brendon (2002b) “Toward Cultural Analysis in Policy Analysis: Picking
Up Where Aaron Wildavsky Left Off,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis 4:
267–85.
© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy

Swedlow et al.

THEORIZING AND GENERALIZING 269

Swedlow, Brendon (2005) Review of “Allan Mazur’s True Warnings and False
Alarms: Evaluating Fears about the Health Risks of Technology, 1948–1971,”
Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2004. In Environmental Science and
Policy 8: 432–35.
Swedlow, Brendon (forthcoming) “Reason for Hope? The Spotted Owl Injunctions
and Policy Change,” Law & Social Inquiry.
Swedlow, Brendon, Denise Kall, Zheng Zhou, James K. Hammitt, and Jonathan B.
Wiener (forthcoming) “Precautionary Regulation in Europe and the United States:
A Comparative Analysis of 100 Representative Risks, 1970–2004.” In The Reality
of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the US and Europe, edited by J. B.
Wiener, M. D. Rogers, J. K. Hammitt, & P. H. Sand.
Tarrow, Sidney (1995) “Bridging the Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Political Science,” American Political Science Review 89: 471–74.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1987) Unﬁnished Business. Washington, DC:
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Ofﬁce of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2002. Terms of the Environment. Available
at http://www.epa.gov/OCEPAterms/ (accessed 21, May 2003).
Verweij, Marco (2000) “Why Is the River Rhine Cleaner than the Great Lakes
(Despite Looser Regulation)?” Law & Society Review 34: 501–48.
Vogel, David (2001) Ships Passing in the Night: The Changing Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies, European University Institute, Working Paper 2001/16, 1.
Vogel, David (2003) “The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of
Consumer and Environmental Regulation in Europe,” British Journal of Political
Science 33: 557–80.
Vogel, Steven K. (1996) Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform in Advanced
Industrial Societies. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press.
Weber, Elke U., and Christopher K. Hsee (2000) “Culture and Individual Judgment
and Decisionmaking,” Applied Psychology: An International Review 49, 1: 32–61.
Webster’s Third International Dictionary, Unabridged. (1993) Published under license
from Merriam-Webster, Incorporated. Available at http://lion.chadwyck.com/
works/search (accessed 8 May 2003).
Wiener, Jonathan B. (2002) “Precaution in a Multirisk World.” In Human and
Ecological Risk Assessment: Theory and Practice, edited by D. J. Paustenbach,
1509–31. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Wiener, Jonathan B. (2003) “Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems,” Duke Journal of International
and Comparative Law 13: 207–62.
Wiener, Jonathan B., Michael D. Rogers, James K. Hammitt, and Peter H. Sand
(eds.) (forthcoming) The Reality of Precaution: Comparing Risk Regulation in the
US and Europe.
Wildavsky, Aaron, and Karl Dake (1990) “Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears
What and Why?” Daedalus 119: 41–60.
Wildavsky, Aaron (1993) “The Comparative Study of Risk Perception: A Beginning.”
In Risk Is a Construct: Perceptions of Risk Perception, edited by B. Rueck. Munich:
Knesebeck.
Wildavsky, Aaron (2006) Cultural Analysis: Politics, Public Law, and Administration,
edited by B. Swedlow. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

© 2009 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2009 Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy

